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abstract: We address the question of why Colombian companies have had such a limited pres-
ence in the american depositary Receipts (adRs) market. traditional explanations state that weak 
investor protection and the degree of economic and financial development in Colombia increase 
the cost of entry in the adR market. However, in the case of Colombia these explanations do not 
suffice because in these respects Colombia is no different from other latin american countries. Us-
ing a theoretical model, we show that additional factors such as drug trafficking and armed conflict 
better explain why Colombian firms have moved away from the adRs market.
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introduction 
over past fifteen years, many latin american firms have cross-listed in the 
Us through the american depository Receipts (adR) program. although 
there are several theories that explain why firms issue adRs1, proposed 
by Coffee (1999) and Karolyi (2004, 2006), this movement is part of the 
“functional convergence”2 toward a stronger corporate governance envi-
ronment. in 1990, the only latin american country with significant par-
ticipation in the Us adR market was mexico, holding the nineteenth place 
among the countries with adRs. However, the situation changed complete-
ly a decade later. in 2003, mexico and Brazil were the largest issuers in the 
Us adR market. in 2005, two of the twenty most successful adRs were 
latin american and the number was duplicated in 2006 (Chong and lópez 
de silanes, 2007, pp. 41). Generally, for an average latin american country 
around fifty percent of the most important stocks have a cross-listing in the 
1 For a review of these theories, see Reese and Weisbach (2002), Karolyi (2004), Karolyi 
(2006), doidge et al. (2004, 2007, 2009, 2010), among others.
2 Functional convergence is an alternative path to reach higher standards of investor pro-
tection, based on more decentralized, market-based, and firm level changes. Functional 
convergence does not require legal reform per se but still brings more firms and assets 
under the umbrella of effective legal protection for investors (Chong and lopez-de-si-
lanes, 2007).
adr colombianos: ¿por QUÉ tan pocos?
resUmen: los autores abordan el cuestionamiento de por qué las em-
presas colombianas han tenido una presencia limitada en el mercado de 
los american depositary Receipts (adRs). explicaciones tradicionales sus-
tentan que una débil protección al inversionista y el grado de desarrollo 
económico y financiero de los países incrementan el costo de entrar en el 
mercado de adR. sin embargo, en el caso de Colombia estas explicaciones 
no son suficientes porque su situación no difiere de manera significati-
va con respecto a otros países latinoamericanos. Utilizando un modelo 
teórico, en este artículo se afirma que factores como el narcotráfico y el 
conflicto armado explican mejor por qué las empresas colombianas se han 
apartado del mercado de adR.
palabras claVe: gobierno corporativo, adR, desarrollo económico y fi-
nanciero, conflicto interno.
adr´s colombiens : poUrQUoi si peU nombreUx ?
rÉsUmÉ: les auteurs se posent la question de la présence limitée des en-
treprises colombiennes sur le marché des american depositary Receipts 
(adRs). il est traditionnellement expliqué qu’une faible protection de 
l’investisseur et le degré de développement économique et financier des 
pays augmentent le coût d’entrée sur le marché des adRs. Cependant, ces 
explications se révèlent insuffisantes pour le cas de la Colombie qui, pour 
ces aspects, ne diffère pas de façon significative par rapport à d’autres 
pays latino-américains. Utilisant un modèle théorique, l’article affirme que 
certains facteurs additionnels tels que le trafic de stupéfiants et le conflit 
armé expliquent mieux les raisons pour lesquelles les entreprises colom-
biennes se sont écartées du marché des adRs.
mots-cleFs : gouvernement corporatif; adRs; développement économi-
que et financier, conflit interne.
adr´s colombianos: por QUe tão poUcos?
resUmo: os autores abordam o questionamento de por que as empresas 
colombianas têm tido uma presença limitada no mercado dos American 
Depositary Receipts (adRs). explicações tradicionais sustentam que uma 
fraca proteção ao investidor e o grau de desenvolvimento econômico e 
financeiro dos países aumentam o custo de entrar no mercado de adRs. 
sem embargo, no caso da Colômbia, estas explicações não são suficientes 
porque, nestes aspectos, a Colômbia não difere de maneira significativa de 
outros países latino-americanos. Utilizando um modelo teórico, afirma-se, 
neste artigo, que fatores adicionais como o narcotráfico e o conflito arma-
do explicam melhor o porquê das empresas colombianas terem se afastado 
do mercado de adRs.
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Us. the number has reached 80% for all the largest issu-
ers in mexico and venezuela, with the number of Brazil-
ian and Chilean firms also growing substantially. However, 
the situation in Colombia is not consistent with this trend. 
Currently only eight of the largest one hundred companies 
trading in the Colombian market have issued adRs, four of 
them in the last two years. in this paper we ask why.
We argue that in addition to observable firm characteris-
tics such as investment opportunities, size, and ownership 
structure; and country characteristics, such as economic 
and financial development, there are other factors that in-
crease the costs of listing abroad. Problems related to “in-
ternal order” such as drug trafficking and armed conflict 
affect the incentives of local companies to adopt global fi-
nancing mechanisms. Reviewing the case of Colombia pro-
vides a good opportunity to show how factors not usually 
found in the business literature affect firms’ participation 
in the international financial markets.
it is generally agreed that there are more advantages than 
disadvantages when a firm lists its shares on a more devel-
oped stock exchange. according to la Porta et al. (2002), 
sarkissian and shill (2004), and doidge et al. (2004), com-
panies that commit themselves to adopting better corpo-
rate governance practices have better market valuation. 
this valuation is the result of, among other things, the con-
fidence that foreign investors have that the controlling 
shareholders will limit the extraction of private benefits. 
likewise, various authors have recognized the reduction of 
the firms’ cost of capital as another important reason to 
issue adRs (Hail and leuz, 2009; Bekaert and Campbell, 
2000; errunza and miller, 2000; stulz, 1999).
moreover, through the adR market firms can improve their 
ability to finance growth opportunities to the extent that it 
increases and diversifies its investment base (Foerster and 
Karolyi, 1999). Chong and lópez-de-silanes (2007) main-
tain that the high liquidity of the foreign market allows 
firms to avoid illiquidity during recessions in the local mar-
ket. at the same time, Reese and Weisbach (2002) argue 
that foreign cross-listing is associated with lower agency 
costs due to better supervision. similarly, Pagano et al. 
(2002) indicate that experience in foreign markets and a 
firm’s reputation are other advantages when listed abroad.
a large portion of the literature explores the benefits of 
cross-listing (see iacobucci, 2004, and doidge et al., 2010). 
However, there are also disadvantages. trading in Us in-
creases the transparency and disclosure requirements, 
which produce an increase in the probability of losing con-
trol of the firm. improvements required by corporate gov-
ernance standards and the potential penalties imposed for 
violations represent threats to controlling shareholders. in 
addition, the costs associated with adoption of standards 
of information disclosure at the international level are part 
of the restrictions facing companies that choose to partici-
pate in the international market (aggarwal et al., 2007).
doidge et al. (2007) propose another perspective to ana-
lyze the process of listing in foreign markets. they point 
out that the adoption of corporate governance mecha-
nisms depends on the cost of applying them. the authors 
state that these costs are largely determined by the coun-
try’s economic and financial development, but also by the 
investor protection environment. if a country provides suf-
ficiently high investor protection, the adoption of strong 
corporate governance mechanisms is not necessary. on the 
other hand, if the economic and financial development of 
a country is too low, the adoption of corporate governance 
mechanisms such as cross-listing carries transaction costs 
that are too high to compensate for their potential ben-
efits. 
extending doidge, Karolyi and stulz’s model (2007), we 
derived factors that explain the limited presence of Colom-
bian firms in the Us adR market. We state that in addition 
to investor protection and the country’s economic and fi-
nancial development, factors related to internal order have 
an important impact on transaction costs when issuing 
adRs and ultimately on the desire of firms to implement 
good governance practices. We stress that the economic 
and financial development of Colombia is similar to that of 
argentina, Brazil, Chile, mexico, and venezuela. moreover, 
for some investor protection measures and financial devel-
opment ratios, Colombia scores better than the rest of the 
countries in the region. However, factors associated with 
internal order, such as drug trafficking and armed conflict, 
have an impact on the willingness of Colombian firms to 
issue adRs.
in this paper, we contribute to the literature by consider-
ing other country-specific factors, beyond economic and fi-
nancial development, which until now have been absent in 
the corporate governance literature, such as internal order 
problems. When companies issue adRs to obtain funds, 
the foreign investor’s perception of the internal order situ-
ation could affect his willingness to invest in turbulent en-
vironments. since we are building our work through the 
analysis of the case of Colombia, it is important to high-
light that in the case-study methodology in general, but 
in this paper in particular, we do not seek to provide “sta-
tistical proof” of anything. Here the goal is to validate our 
ideas conceptually using a single case. Further efforts will 
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be necessary to go forwards from this conceptual valida-
tion (as in our paper) to a statistical validation3.
3 yin (2003) put it in this way: “a second common concern about 
case studies is that they provide little basis for scientific gener-
alization. How can you generalize from a single case? is a fre-
quently heard question […] the short answer is that case studies, 
like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical proposition and 
not to populations or universes. in this sense, the case study, like 
the experiment, does not represent a ‘sample’ and in doing a case 
study, your goal will be to expand and generalize theories (analytic 
in the following section we present our extension of 
doidge, Karolyi and stulz’s model (2007), from which we 
obtain our principal predictions. then, we analyze predic-
tions of the model in the context of the Colombian case. 
Finally, we offer conclusions.
generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical gen-
eralization)” (yin, 2003, p. 10).
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the model 
our model follows closely doidge, Karolyi and stulz’ model 
(2007), which in turn extends to shleifer and Wolfenzon 
(2002). the model’s general idea is that countries differ 
not only in how they protect investors, but also in the costs 
associated with market access and implementation of cor-
porate governance mechanisms. doidge, Karolyi and stulz 
(2007) show that if the cost of implementing good cor-
porate governance in countries with low economic and fi-
nancial development is excessive, the benefits perceived 
by firms in implementing such a process are, if anything, 
marginal. thus, firms located in countries with such char-
acteristics tend to find unnecessary to implement good 
corporate governance mechanisms. in synthesis, the contri-
bution these authors make is in recognizing the existence 
of economic and financial development, below which, con-
vergence mechanisms in corporate governance are inac-
cessible due to the high transaction costs4.
according to this analysis, we can define three levels at 
which firms can decide to implement or not external gov-
ernance mechanisms: a low level, where firms operate in 
countries with very poor economic and financial develop-
ment and weak investor protection, and therefore they 
cannot obtain any net benefit by issuing adRs. a high 
level where firms enjoy a very high standard in terms of 
financial development and investor protection, and there-
fore there is no need to list abroad to improve their already 
good corporate governance. Finally, a medium level where 
firms can improve their corporate governance by taking ac-
tions such as issuing adRs.
our extension is based on a simple idea: transaction costs 
are not solely affected by the country’s economic and fi-
nancial development, but also by problems of social order 
a country faces. this new factor changes the level at which 
the implementation of external corporate governance, 
such as issuing adRs, is optimal. 
structure of the model 
the model assumes that the proportion of private bene-
fits, f, which the controlling shareholder can extract from 
4 Bergman and nicolaievsky (2007) present another model studying 
additional factors affecting the mechanisms adopted by firms to 
provide better protection to their investors. these authors assume 
that each country regime is characterized by the set of contracts 
that it can enforce; hence, legal regimes differ in their ability to 
enforce some kind of contracts. this assumption allows them to 
present a model in which the insiders choose offer protection con-
tracts inside a country according to their motivations and the legal 
regime.
minority shareholders, is influenced by the costs of good 
corporate governance mechanisms, as well as by the legal 
system and the country’s economic situation. as the con-
trolling shareholder’s private benefits are not, by nature, 
observable, cross-listing could limit such extraction and 
create favorable expectations for minority shareholders. at 
the same time, the model explains that if transaction costs 
for issuing shares abroad exceed the benefits ex post, issu-
ing adRs may not be feasible.
Stage t = 0 
as in doidge et al. (2007), a controlling shareholder has 
an initial wealth equal to W and has to invest K to take 
advantage of an investment opportunity, where (K > W). 
the return on the investment is R = aKα, where 0 < α < 1 
and a > 0. the controlling shareholder must issue (K – W) 
in shares to foreign investors. in this way, when the control-
ling shareholder secures the funds, investors develop ex-
pectations regarding the proportion of the company’s cash 
flow that will be expropriated as private benefits, f, by the 
controlling shareholder. 
Stage t = 1
expropriation by the controlling shareholder is costly. this 
cost increases because minority shareholders are protected 
at the country level, p, and at the company level, q. thus, 
the cost of extracting private benefits E( f ) is
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f  otherwise.          (6) 
                                                               ( ) ( ) αααπ faKqpaKbfaKfvC ++−−= 25.01  (7) 
   ( )( ) απ aKfkM −−= 11  (8) 
 
 (1)
where 0.5bf 2 is a cost factor associated with the propor-
tion of private benefits, f, which the controlling sharehold-
er could extract. K is the amount required to realize the 
investment opportunity; p and q are the level of investor 
protection by the country and by the firm respectively; and 
b, a and α are positive parameters. From equation (1) we 
can see that the expropriation costs increase with p and q 
and, ultimately, minority shareholders are better protected 
when p and q increase.
Given that the level of investor protection chosen by the 
firm, denoted by q, makes it costly to adopt good gover-
nance mechanisms, it is assumed that the marginal cost of 
corporate governance is increasing. this supports a func-
tional form for the cost of corporate governance, given that 
C(q) = mq2, where m and q are both positive constants. 
the reasoning is that other measures to increase the qual-
ity of the firm’s corporate governance could be available.
as in doidge et al. (2007), there are transaction costs as-
sociated with raising capital from foreign investors, for ex-
ample, by issuing adRs. so an issue equal to (K – W) is 
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associated with a cost of n(K – W), where n is the transac-
tion costs of obtaining capital, which is influenced by the 
country’s economic and financial development. the value 
of n is assumed as a constant between 0 and 1. We as-
sumed a risk neutral world with a risk free rate normalized 
at zero. that is, minority shareholders buy shares as long 
as they can guarantee, through the payment of dividends, 
an amount equal to their initial investment. Ultimately, n 
represents non-financial transaction costs, such as invest-
ment in more efficient operating systems, specifying pro-
cesses and costs incurred in complying with international 
standards, among others. 
We assume that n is influenced by two basic factors: the 
country’s economic and financial development, d, and the 
internal order problems that increase the transaction costs 
of obtaining foreign capital, s. as stated above, the foreign 
investor’s perception of the internal order situation could 
affect his or her willingness to invest. in addition, com-
panies may adopt practices that protect them from such 
situations but also distance them from international stan-
dards; or compliance with international standards may be 
costly. therefore, the capital needed to invest in the proj-
ect is associated with a cost of n(K – W) = n(d + s)(K – W), 
0 ≤ d + s ≤ 1.
Stage t = 2 
the controlling shareholder extracts an optimal proportion 
of private benefits f* that maximize the ex post value of 
his payments. He seeks to maximize his share of a com-
pany’s benefit, S, that is the firm’s total cash flow after 
subtracting the transaction costs associated with issuing 
foreign capital n(K – W), the cost of the corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms C(q), the cost of extracting private 
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which, after substituting, is equal to 
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f  otherwise.          (6) 
                                                               ( ) ( ) αααπ faKqpaKbfaKfvC ++−−= 25.01  (7) 




subject to S ≥ 0 and f*.
in the maximization problem in (2), the controlling share-
holder chooses K, q and f. it is important to point out that 
K could be considered as a variable to the extent that 
there are various amounts associated with different invest-
ments opportunities. However, once the controlling share-
holder has chosen an investment opportunity, the amount 
K becomes fixed. the maximization problem is subject to 
two restrictions. the first refers to the controlling share-
holder only investing if S ≥ 0 (participation constraints). 
the second restriction refers to the amount of private ben-
efits to extract, f, which must be such that it maximizes the 
controlling shareholder’s benefit (incentives compatibility 
constraints).
the selection of K, q and f is not simultaneous. f is deter-
mined once the shares have been sold to foreign investors. 
therefore, after the controlling investor has chosen q and 
K (level of protection for the investor and the amount re-
quired to realize the respective investment opportunity), 
minority investors purchase shares for an amount equal to 
(K – W). subsequent to the sale of shares, to the control-
ling shareholder is given a proportion, v, of the firm’s total 
cash flow, which in turn is determined by the quantity of 
private benefits he extracts, f.
in a scenario without expropriation, v is determined by the 
firm’s total cash flow, CF, which in turn is the return on 
investment, that is, CF = R = aKα. However, when there 
is expropriation by the controlling shareholder, the firm’s 
total cash flow is reduced in proportion to private benefits 
expropriated, CF = (1 – f*)aKα. therefore, and given that 
the amount of cash flow the minority shareholder receives 
is equal to its reserve profit, U = (K – W), the proportion of 
the firm’s total cash flow that he or she receives under the 
expropriation scenario is given by 
 1 
              ( ) ( )qpaKbffE += α25.0  
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Ultimately, the proportion of cash flows appropriated by 
the controlling shareholder, v, is:
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f  otherwise.          (6) 
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   ( )( ) απ aKfkM −−= 11  (8) 
 
. (3)
therefore, after securing funds the controlling sharehold-
er chooses the proportion to be expropriated, f, where 
0 ≤ f < 1, such that it maximizes
 
( ) ( )[ ]faKqpaKbfaKfv
f
++25.01max  (4)
where v(1–f*)aKα is the liquidated dividends that the con-
trolling shareholder receives, 0.5bf 2 aKα (p + q) is the costs 
of extracting private benefits, and faKα is the total of pri-
vate benefits extracted by the controlling shareholder. tak-
ing first order conditions yields:
 
 1 
             ( ) ( )qpaKbffE += α25.0  
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f  otherwise.          (6) 
                                                               ( ) ( ) αααπ faKqpaKbfaKfvC ++−−= 25.01  (7) 
   ( )( ) απ aKfkM −−= 11  (8) 
 
. (5)
the above solution indicates that the amount of cash flow 
expropriated decreases as (p + q) increases. likewise, v is 
decreasing, that is, to the extent that the controlling share-
holder has greater participation in the firm’s cash flows, he 
or she will have less incentive to expropriate. Replacing (3) 
in (5) it holds that
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the previous result shows that f depends on K and q, 
which are variables of the controlling shareholder’s deci-
sion. therefore, f could be seen as f (K, q). so, f depends on 
the firm’s level of protection, q, and the expropriation costs 
C(q) = mq2. if m is low, the company could cheaply improve 
investor protection in the country, by improving protection 
at the company level. in the extreme case, if m = 0, inves-
tor protection at the country level becomes irrelevant and 
the controlling shareholder chooses a level q sufficiently 
high (q → ∞) so that f = 0. However, if the amount of for-
eign capital secured by the firm, for example through is-
suing adRs, is very small, there are no incentives for the 
firm to improve the level of q, if the associated transac-
tion costs, n, do not compensate the perceived benefits 
of adopting good governance mechanisms. thus, following 
doidge et al. (2007), we state:
Proposition 1: If parameter m, which is the inductor of 
cost of governance at the firm level, is equal to zero, all 
the firms that secure funds abroad choose a value of in-
vestment protection at the firm level, q, that is sufficient-
ly high so that the fraction of cash flow expropriated, f, 
will equal zero and investor protection by the State is ir-
relevant.
Proof: see appendix.
Proposition 2: To the extent that m increases, q decreas-
es and investor protection depends almost exclusively on 
protection guaranteed by the State, p.
Proof: see appendix.
Proposition 3: To the extent that p increases and m is 
greater than zero, q decreases because governance mech-
anisms at the firm level are redundant and costly.
Proof: see appendix.
Proposition 4: Finally, for firms whose inductor param-
eter of the costs of securing foreign capital, n, is suffi-
ciently elevated, q equals zero because the firm does not 
expect to secure foreign capital.
Proof: see appendix.
these propositions show that the company’s choice of gov-
ernance mechanisms (for example, issuing adRs) depends 
on the cost of applying these mechanisms and the trans-
action costs of issuing shares. these costs are determined 
not only by investor protection at the country level and 
by the country’s economic and financial development, but 
also, as we propose in this paper, by problems related to 
social order, such as illegal armed groups, illegal traffic in 
arms and drugs, asset laundering and the presence of illicit 
money in the economy. all of which affects the willingness 
of companies located in a given country to adopt mecha-
nisms such as issuing adRs. 
Stage t = 3 
Payments made by the controlling shareholder to the mi-
nority shareholders after the expropriation, are the follow-
ing: 
Payment for the controlling shareholder, pc, is determined 
by the dividends corresponding to his participation in the 
firm’s cash flow after expropriation, v(1–f )aKα, the expro-
priation costs 0.5bf 2 aKα (p + q), and the benefits ob-
tained by it faKα:
( ) ( ) faKqpaKbfaKfvC ++= 25.01  (7)
the payment to the minority shareholder, pM, is deter-
mined by the dividends corresponding to participation 
(1 – v) in the firm’s cash flows after the expropriation, 
which will equal the reservation profits:
 ( )( )aKfkM = 11  (8)
predictions of the model 
the model developed up to this point offers the follow-
ing predictions. in the hypothetical unrealistic scenario in 
which the implementation of good governance practices 
at the firm level does not have cost, all companies would 
develop business practices that would make state protec-
tion unnecessary. in countries with high investor protec-
tion, additional efforts by companies to implement good 
corporate governance practices beyond those required 
by the regulatory framework are costly and redundant. in 
countries with low economic and financial development it 
is possible that the costs of implementing good corporate 
governance mechanisms exceed the perceived benefits. 
Finally, the transaction costs assumed by the companies 
could be affected, not just by the country’s economic and 
financial development, but also by factors associated with 
internal order, such as the armed conflict and drug traf-
ficking.
in the following section, we address the Colombian case, 
not with a view to empirically validating the model, which 
is clearly not possible from just one observation, but to 
highlight some of the model’s main theoretical arguments. 
analysis of the colombian case 
Corporate governance literature shows a substantial het-
erogeneity in the behavior of firms in emerging markets. 
Chong and lópez-de-silanes (2007) maintain that for the 
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case of latin america, even under distorting conditions 
such as insufficient legal protection and weak rule of law, 
improvement could be made if firms begin to adopt better 
corporate governance practices. Following Coffee (1999), 
one of the alternatives available to firms to reach high cor-
porate governance standards is functional convergence, 
which refers to changes at the firm level that somehow by-
pass the local investor protection environment. in this sense, 
functional convergence does not require legal reforms per 
se, but firms could attract more investors under the rubric 
of self-imposed protection for shareholders. the existence 
of cross-listing programs in the Us is a good mechanism to 
promote the improvement of corporate governance at the 
firm level regardless of the local legal environment. 
development of adr programs in latin america 
in the past fifteen years, there has been a great move-
ment toward cross-listing by latin american firms. latin 
american adRs programs represent about 13% of the to-
tal programs available throughout the world. in the pe-
riod 2005-2006, latin american companies had five of 
the largest fifteen adR programs in the world and five of 
the twenty most actively traded adRs in the United states 
(Chong y lópez de silanes, 2007, p. 41). some cases are 
worth mentioning. For example, venezuelan firms showed 
a great dynamism in the nineties with nine new firms in the 
adRs program, while in this decade only two companies 
decided to issue this type of instrument. the second inter-
esting case is Brazil, which in 2007 increased the number 
of firms with adRs programs by nearly 50%. Finally, the 
special case of Colombia stands out from the rest, with 
poor participation by the country’s firms in the issuing of 
adRs, although this situation has been changing over the 
past decade. 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of issuers from each coun-
try in the adR program of the new york stock exchange. 
mexico and argentina are the countries in which more 
national firms have adopted these corporate governance 
mechanisms. venezuela and Brazil show very similar per-
centages despite the difference in their market size. While 
in venezuela 10 firms of the 65 issuers have adRs, in Bra-
zil 88 of the 573 issuers have adRs. Chilean companies 
have participated moderately in implementing these gov-
ernance mechanisms, possibly due to the liquidity of the 
market in which these firms operate. it is evident that Co-
lombian firms are the least active in the region in issuing 
adRs. Fewer than 7% of the firms listed on the exchange 
have adRs. Karolyi (2004) states that for the average 
latin american country, around 50 percent of the most 
active stocks have cross-listed their shares in the Us mar-
ket. in the case of mexico and venezuela, in 2000 this 
percentage has approached 80 percent. the number of 















Mexico Argentina Venezuela Brazil Chile Colombia
FigUre 1. percentage of firms with adrs by country. participation of listed firms in the adrs program for: argentina, brazil, 
chile, colombia, mexico , and Venezuela for the year 2010.
Source: Prepared from data provided by the securities exchanges of the countries analyzed. Stock exchange of Colombia, http://www.bvc.com/, Stock exchange of Caracas, http://www.bolsadecaracas.
com/, Securities market of Buenos Aires, http://www.merval.sba.com.ar/, Stock exchange of Brazil -- Bovespa, http://www.bovespa.com.br/, Commercial exchange of Santiago, http://www.
bolsadesantiago.com/ and Mexican Securities Exchange, http://www.bmv.com.mx/ 
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Generally, the growth in the number of latin american 
firms that issue adRs is evident. this would support the 
idea that, in countries with weak investor protection, firms 
implement functional convergence mechanisms. However, 
this intuition does not apply for Colombia. the first Colom-
bian firm to issue adRs was Bancolombia, a financial sec-
tor company, in July 1995. the second did not take place 
until december 2002, by the Corporación Financiera Co-
lombiana, which belonged to the same sector. in 2004 the 
third issuer was Interconexión Eléctrica S. A., a company 
from the electricity sector. Almacenes Éxito, a firm in the 
“big box” store sector, was to issue adRs in 2007. Finally, 
since 2008 Ecopetrol (the Colombian petroleum company) 
(2008), Cementos Argos (2008), Grupo de Inversiones 
Suramericana (2008), Grupo Nutresa S. A. (2009), and In-
terbolsa (2010), these latter four being private companies, 
have issued adRs challenging the low participation in in-
ternational markets by Colombian firms in recent years. 
We revised the seC ś requirements to identify if they rep-
resent potentials obstacles for Colombian firms to decide 
to issue adRs. table 1 shows the types and characteristics 
of the adRs programs. as seen in this table, the program 
type of depositary receipts determines the requirements 
that the issuer has to accomplish. Five of the Colombian 
firms with adRs programs are level 1 (Cementos argos, 
















otC-traded american depositary receipts (adRs) are negotiable securities issued by a depositary bank that represent a non U.s. 
company's publicly traded equity. these securities are denominated in U.s. dollars and trade in the U.s. on the over-the counter 
(otC) market. they do not require U.s. seC registration and disclosure or compliance with the sarbanes-oxley act. sponsored otC-
traded adRs are issued by a single depositary bank under a service contract or deposit agreement with the foreign private issuer. 
they offer the issuer control of the economic and political rights of the facility as well as the flexibility to shape the program’s de-
tails in the company’s best interests.
 1933, 1934  F-6, 12g3-2(b) 
local disclosure is sufficient critical financials in 
english must be available online
 otC Pink sheets  must Upgrade 
over-the-counter 




the otcQX tier is reserved for companies traded on qualified exchanges in their home country. otcQX-traded securities are required 
to appoint a qualified, third-party Principal american liaison (Pal) sponsor to help them with the listing process, post disclosures 
in english, and be available as a trusted resource regarding all aspects of U.s. market protocols and investor information needs. 
these companies are pre-screened and are required to disclose two years of financials which are posted on the otcQX website for 
investor access. although otcQX-traded adRs are still 12g3-2(b) exempt and do not require seC registration nor sarbanes-oxley 
compliance, they may be viewed more favorably by investors because of their increased disclosure requirements and transparency.
 1933, 1934  F-6, 12g3-2(b) 
Principal american liaison required Blue sky Com-
pliance otcQX must Upgrade two years of public 
financials in english must be available and listed 
on otcQX website
 otC Qx  must Upgrade 
level 2 U.s 
traded
non-U.s. companies looking to increase U.s. market interest of their securities and list on a U.s. stock exchange, but not currently 
raise capital, establish sponsored exchange-listed dRs. these issuers must register under the securities act of 1933 and report un-
der the exchange act of 1934 by filing an initial registration statement and periodic reports on Form 20-F. issuers must reconcile 
their financial statements to U.s. GaaP or iFRs, meet the listing requirements of the chosen stock exchange and meet strict corpo-
rate governance requirements mandated by the sarbanes-oxley act.
interim financial statements and current developments must also be furnished on a timely basis to the seC on Form 6-K, to the 
extent such information is made public or filed with an exchange in the home country, or distributed to shareholders. in exchange 
for meeting these strict regulatory requirements, these types of adRs can be listed on the major U.s. stock exchanges, the nyse, 
nyse amex or nasdaQ, and are often widely covered by the U.s. financial analyst and media community, providing investors with 
increased information about the issuer and its securities.
 1933, 1934 





 must Upgrade 
level 3 U.s listed
this is the primary capital markets tool used by non-U.s. companies to list and raise capital in the U.s. exchange-listed, capital rais-
ing adRs obtain maximum visibility and liquidity for the issuer and are typically used to raise a minimum of $50 million. as with any 
U.s.-listed adR, issuers of this type of adR must reconcile their financial statements to iFRs or U.s. GaaP, meet the listing require-
ments of the chosen stock exchange and meet the strict corporate governance requirements mandated by the sarbanes-oxley act. 
the primary difference, from a documentation standpoint, is the capital raising portion which requires issuers
to prepare and file a Form F-1 with the U.s. seC. Form F-1 includes the prospectus and provides a detailed description of both the 
issuer and the capital raising transaction. annual reports on Form 20-F and interim financial statements and current developments 
on Form 6-K must be furnished on a timely basis to the seC. an issuer may also raise capital in subsequent offerings. in such a fol-
low-on offering, the issuer may be able to file an abbreviated registration statement Form F-2 or Form F-3 with the seC.
 1933, 1934 






 yes – Full U.s. and 
Global 
source: Bny mellon depositary Receipts.
j o u r n a l
r e v i s t a
innovar










1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 










Chile Colombia Latin America
FigUre 2. aggregate measurement of the variation of gross domestic product taking as a base 100 for the year 1990. 
graph shows the aggregate percentage variation of gross domestic product taking as a base 100 for the year 1990 for the 
countries colombia, chile, and latin america for the period between 1990 and 2008.
Source: UNESCO (2000) and CEPAL (2007) about the official database, http://www.eclac.cl/.
interconexión eléctrica s. a, interbolsa, Grupo de inversio-
nes suramericana, and Grupo nutresa s. a.), two are lev-
el 2 (ecopetrol and Corporación Financiera Colombiana), 
and two are level 3 (Bancolombia and almacenes Éxito). if 
we take into account the requirements of the lowest level, 
all firms with high and medium marketability in the Co-
lombian stock exchange are eligible (38 firms) to cross list 
in the U.s market. in percentage terms, approximately 24 
percent of the eligible firms are adRs issuers in the foreign 
market. this percentage was only the 3% in 2000 and 8% 
in 2005.
this situation shows the backwardness of the nineties and 
the slow movement of Colombian companies toward north 
american markets. it is worth asking: Why have only few 
Colombian firms issued adRs, despite the potential advan-
tages inherent in this type of mechanism?
the country’s economic and financial 
development and transaction costs 
arguments put forth by doidge et al. (2007) call atten-
tion to the importance of the country’s characteristics for 
the implementation of good corporate governance sys-
tems; these characteristics influence the cost-benefit ra-
tio incurred by firms when committing themselves to good 
corporate governance practices. in this way, the decision 
that firms make to adopt mechanisms that guarantee 
high quality corporate governance depends largely on the 
country in which the firm is located. However, this commit-
ment could be prohibitively costly in countries with weak 
investor protection and low economic and financial devel-
opment. along these lines, it is conceivable that firms in 
countries with low economic and financial development 
will find it optimal to invest less in corporate governance, 
and minority shareholders’ rights will be determined main-
ly at the country level rather than at the firm level.
therefore, it becomes important to analyze Colombia’s 
economic and financial development in recent decades, 
and to compare it with other latin american countries and 
see if this explains the limited presence of this country in 
the adRs market. We use 2008 as year of comparison be-
cause up until that year, Colombia had only four compa-
nies issuing adRs and, if theoretical predictions of doidge 
et al. (2007) apply to this country, we would find Colombia 
to be the country showing the worst economic and finan-
cial development in latin america. 
Countries in this region have shown capacity to grow 
at relatively high rates over an extended period of time 
(Cardoso and Fishlow, 1992). However, with regard to the 
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economic performance as well as the perception of foreign 
investors, Colombia has performed in many cases better 
than the rest of the countries in the region. 
Using data from UnesCo (2000) and CePal (2007) re-
garding Gross domestic Product (GdP) in latin american 
countries between 1990 and 2008 (estimated), the follow-
ing facts emerge: the aggregate average growth of the 
GdP for latin american countries over the past 19 years is 
80.64%, which equals a 3.16% average annual increase. 
Growth for Colombia has been about average (95.82% ag-
gregate and 3.6% annual average). this growth is greater 
than Brazil (61.1% aggregate and 2.54% annual average), 
venezuela (86.75% aggregate and 3.34% annual aver-
age) and mexico (79.7% aggregate and 3.13% annual 
average). the only countries in this study that exceed Co-
lombia’s growth rate are argentina (104.94% aggregate 
and 3.85% annual average) and Chile (158.17% aggre-
gate and 5.12% annual average). this provides evidence 
that Colombia’s economic performance in terms of GdP 
has been better than the countries that are most active in 
issuing adRs, such as Brazil and mexico. Figure 2 shows 
the aggregate percent variation in GdP for Chile, the coun-
try with the highest economic growth in the region, for Co-
lombia, and the average for latin america. 
Figure 3 shows comparative data for the five countries an-
alyzed in this article and the average for latin america, 
in relation to aggregate percentage growth in the Gross 
domestic Product between 1990 and 2008. note how the 
countries with the greatest economic growth in the sample 
are Chile, argentina and Colombia. 
now we review the published country risk classifications 
(see Figure 4). the scores granted by Fitch Ratings and 
moody’s put only Chile and mexico in the “investment 
grade” category. on the other hand, Colombia and Bra-
zil earned a similar classification, while venezuela and ar-
gentina display the lowest scores in the group of countries 
we studied. Given the importance that investors assign to 
these risk classifications, this could indicate that for firms 
located in argentina and venezuela access to adRs pro-
grams would be more limited than for Colombia. one can 
expect that Colombia would have the same level of partici-
pation as Brazil and similar to mexico. However, this is not 
the case, as is seen in Figure 15. 
5 in march 2011, standard & Poor’s raised Colombia’s rating to invest-
ment grade. However, for twelve years, Colombia had had a specu-
lative-grade rating while similar countries as Chile and mexico have 
investment-grade rating. an alternative explanation for a higher lev-
el of country risk classification of Colombia in comparison to ven-
ezuela and argentina during the 2000s in despite of the Colombian 
internal order problems, it is its excellent payment history. Colombia 
has never missed a payment.
FigUre 3. cumulative percentage growth in the gross domestic product for the period 1990-2008. aggregate percentage 
growth of gross domestic product for the period 1990-2008. the figure 100 in the year 1990 is taken as a base for the 
countries argentina, brazil, chile, colombia, mexico, and Venezuela.
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the emerging markets Bond index (emBi), calculated by JP 
morgan, shows the spread between the yields of sovereign 
bonds from a given country with respect to the yield of Us 
sovereign bonds. this difference is attributable to a default 
risk premium on the sovereign debt market. emBi makes it 
possible to predict the costs of capital for firms in a given 
country. in 2008, mexico and Chile were the countries that 
offer the lower premium to foreign investors. after these 
two countries came Colombia. this performance is attrib-
utable to the tradition of payment that has sustained the 
country throughout its history. For Brazil, argentina, and 
venezuela, securing funds in foreign capital markets were 
more costly, so one can assume that Colombian firms must 
have shown a greater propensity to enter the foreign capi-
tal markets. despite a deficient risk classification, firms lo-
cated in Brazil, argentina and venezuela have been more 
active in the adRs market. 
Finally, in relation to economic policies it is pertinent to 
analyze currency devaluation in latin american countries. 
to the extent that a country shows greater devaluation, 
abroad financing is more costly. Ultimately, high devalua-
tion could be a factor that affects the propensity of firms 
to enter foreign capital markets. to show the performance 
of devaluation we took data from the official rate of ex-
change from december 2002 to 2008. the most stable 
countries in terms of exchange rate have been Chile and 
Colombia, followed by argentina, mexico and venezuela. 
Brazil shows devaluation without a point of comparison in 
the period analyzed, approximately three hundred times 
greater than Chile’s devaluation in percentage terms. this 
implies that firms located in Chile and Colombia that seek 
outside debt get on average the lowest costs in cumula-
tive terms, due to losses on the exchange rate. Figure 5 
shows the aggregate variation in currency devaluation for 
the countries studied, except Brazil due to its atypical per-
formance, for the period 1992-2008.
in addition to taking into account economic development, 
it is also necessary to analyze financial development as 
well. Chong and lópez-de-silanes (2007) show that Co-
lombian stock market capitalization as a fraction of GdP 
equals 14.27%, which puts Colombia behind Chile, argen-
tina, mexico and Brazil, but ahead of venezuela, which has 
stock market capitalization of 5.5% of its GdP for 2006.
With respect to market depth, measured in terms of own-
ership concentration, Colombia and mexico are the coun-
tries with the greatest ownership concentration with 64% 
and 65%, respectively. various authors have argued that 
these high levels of shareholder ownership could affect 
the propensity to issue adRs. For example, doidge et al. 
(2009) found that the rights of controlling shareholders are 
FigUre 4. sovereign risk classification. sovereign risk classification ratings for argentina, brazil, chile, colombia, mexico, 
and Venezuela by Fitch Ratings and Moody’s risk classifiers for the month of april 2008.
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negatively related to the existence of cross-listing in the 
Us. even though these arguments would partially explain 
what we see in the Colombian case, they do not corre-
spond to the case of mexico. Ultimately, ownership con-
centration does not offer a satisfactory explanation for the 
lack of utilization of adRs by Colombian companies.
in addition, Chong and lópez-de-silanes (2007) argue 
that latin american capital markets are poorly developed. 
in fact, the size of the capital market on average in latin 
american countries is less than half of the world mean. 
this is supported by the ratio of the number of firms rela-
tive to the population being approximately a quarter of 
the world mean (5.29% compared to 27.73%), and that 
number of iPos with respect to the population is almost 
10 times smaller than the global mean (0.23% compared 
to 2.97%).
Given these conditions, the intuition offered by doidge et 
al. (2007) is insufficient to explain why Colombian firms 
have such a limited presence in the adR market. as shown, 
economic and financial development of mexico, argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and venezuela are relatively similar to that 
of Colombia and so the transaction costs that Colombian 
companies incur in implementing adRs would be similar 
to those assumed by companies located in other countries 
in the region. We will show below how internal order prob-
lems offer a complementary explanation of the particulari-
ties of the Colombian case.
Firm level characteristics 
some authors recognize the importance of the firm’s 
characteristics for implementation of good governance 
mechanisms, such as the issuing of adRs. Coffee (2002) 
maintains that firms with high ownership concentration 
tend to behave differently from those with dispersed 
ownership, with the first seeking to maximize private con-
trol benefits and the latter tending to maximize share 
price. as a result, they have different attitudes toward 
accessing foreign financial markets and imposing more 
stringent legal rules on themselves. Ultimately, firms that 
issue adRs limit their expropriation ability (Coffee, 1999; 
Reese and Weisbach, 2002; doidge et al., 2004; dyck 
and Zingales, 2004).
However, latin american firms’ ownership concentration 
levels have always been high relatively to other developed 
nations. Chong and lópez-de-silanes (2007) show that 
FigUre 5. aggregate variation in currency devaluation taking as a base 100 for data from 1992. the aggregate percentage 
variation in currency devaluation is shown, taking as a base 100 for the year 1992 for the countries argentina, chile, 
colombia, mexico, and Venezuela for the period between 1992 and 2008.
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table 2. growth opportunities and the decision of issue adrs.
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics
mean differences  t statistic
Variable obs. mean median std. dev.
mean 
differences  t 
statistic
Growth opportunities
all firms 4617 0.013 0.011 0.846
Firms without adRs 4541 0.009 0.008 0.847 -2.669
Firms with adRs 76 0.270 0.106 0.769 ***















Regression Re - Gls
industrial sector dummies yes
dummy for residual outliers no
observations 4617





specification tests for random effects
lagrange multiplier test for Re
17808
[0.000]
notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, p values are in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
table 2 shows a preliminary descriptive statistic (Panel a) and a panel probit random effects regression (Panel B) studying the relationship 
between growth opportunities and the decision of issue adRs. Performing the regression, we use as endogenous variable a dummy that 
takes the value of 1 if the firms has issued adRs, and zero otherwise. our explanatory variables are growth opportunities (as the percentage 
growth in sales), firm size (as the natural log of the book value of total assets), firm age (as the number of years since the firm’s inception), 
and the industrial sector of the firm (we break down the data by major industry sector, isiC-two digits). the regression specification tests 
reject the null hypothesis of no individual effects. thus, we perform a panel data regression. in addition, we choose the random effects 
specification due to the industrial sector variables are time invariant dummies.
average ownership concentration worldwide is 47%, while 
the average for latin america is 58%. Chile is the coun-
try with the lowest shareholder concentration (45%), while 
the countries that are the most active in adRs, such as 
mexico and Brazil, display high shareholder concentration 
(64% and 57%, respectively). this indicator for Colombia, 
argentina and venezuela is equally high (63%, 53%, and 
51%). despite the dispersion in concentration levels, the 
differences are not representative and do not explain why 
Colombian firms have issued so few adRs.
on the other hand, durnev and Kim (2005) found that 
the quality of governance practices is positively related to 
the firms’ growth opportunities. From this, one can assume 
that the companies that have issued adRs in Colombia are 
those with the highest growth ratios. However, our analy-
sis of the 530 largest companies in Colombia for the pe-
riod 1996-2006 reveals that growth ratios (percentage of 
increase in sales) do not explain the firm’s decision of is-
sue adRs after controlling for firm size, age and indus-
try. to do this, we collected information from the national 
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equity-issuer Registry Forms (Registro nacional de valores 
e intermediarios, Rnvi) filed by Colombia’s Financial su-
perintendence (sFin) and the Colombia’s superintendence 
for Commercial societies (ssoC), mainly. thus, the working 
sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 530 firms for 
the period 1996-2006 (5,150 firm-year observations). of 
those, 477 belong to one of the 30 largest business groups 
in the country. this sample includes nine Colombian firms 
that have issued adRs. 
table 2 shows a preliminary descriptive statistic (Panel a) 
and a panel probit random effects regression (Panel B) 
studying the relationship between growth opportunities 
and the decision of issue adRs. in an univariate analy-
sis (Panel a), preliminary statistic shows a higher level of 
growth opportunities for firms with adRs when compar-
ing with those firms that do not issue that kind of instru-
ments. this difference is statistically significant in a test 
of differences in means. However, these results change in 
a multivariate analysis. to perform this analysis (Panel B) 
we use as endogenous variable a dummy that takes the 
value of 1 if the firm has issued adRs, and zero otherwise. 
our explanatory variables are growth opportunities (as the 
percentage growth in sales), firm size (as the natural log 
of the book value of total assets), firm age (as the number 
of years since the firm’s inception), and the industrial sec-
tor of the firm (we break down the data by major industry 
sector, isiC-two digits). the regression specification tests 
reject the null hypothesis of no individual effects. thus, we 
perform a panel data regression. in addition, we choose 
the random effects specification due to the industrial sec-
tor variables are time invariant dummies. the results show 
that the growth opportunities do not have an impact on 
the decision of firms in regards to the issuance of adRs in 
the Colombian case. 
this result in regards to the relation between growth op-
portunities and the issuance of adRs suggests that Colom-
bian firms have been satisfying their funding necessities in 
the internal market. this supports the predictions of our 
theoretical model because it seems that the benefits of 
issue adRs for Colombian firms are lower than the costs 
associated to this kind of instrument. during the 1990s 
the interest rate in Colombia was extremely high, reaching 
levels of 45% for the Colombian sovereign debt, and levels 
of 75% for consumption loans. in despite of this high level 
of cost for local loans and in despite of growth opportuni-
ties, firms did not use adRs as a mechanism to get fund-
ing abroad. 
as with the country’s economic and financial develop-
ment, some firm’s characteristics do not appear to be a 
strong enough factor to explain the behavior of Colombian 
companies with respect to cross-listing their shares in the 
Us market. 
it is important to stress that we decided to control by in-
dustry in the regression reported in table 2 because the 
decision of issue adRs could be affected by this variable. 
Revising the Colombian case, we have four firms in finan-
cial services industry and one bank as issuers of adRs. this 
fact is in accordance with the pattern that we find in lat-
in america. table 3 shows the number of firms that issue 
adRs classified by industries for argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, mexico and venezuela. the most active indus-
tries issuing adRs are electricity, real estate investment 
and services, banks, financial services, food producers, and 
construct and materials. the nine Colombian firms that is-
sue adRs belong to five of these six sectors. 
internal order problems and transaction costs 
the north american Congress on latin america (naCla, 
1997) characterized the drug trafficking kings in Colom-
bia, Pablo escobar (from the city of medellín), and the 
Rodriguez orejuela brothers (from the city of Calí), in a 
contradictory manner. While the first was associated with 
acts of violence, the latter were considered businessmen. 
Gilberto orejuela created his first pharmaceutical compa-
ny at the age of 25 and by the time he was 50 it had 
become the biggest diversified group in the Colombian 
pharmaceutical sector. in a 1991 interview, Gilberto ore-
juela stated that in the city of Calí, his companies gen-
erated employment for more than 4,000 people (Quinn, 
1991). according to anti-drug intelligence services, the 
Rodriguez brothers used their legal economic activities to 
launder money, obtain supplies and gather the intelligence 
information necessary to keep their illicit operations hid-
den. many Colombian drug traffickers used these tactics: 
to penetrate established businesses or to start their own to 
hide their illegal activities.
on the other hand, legitimate firms felt threatened by the 
possibility of being captured by the drug business and re-
sponded with even more concentrated ownership. Follow-
ing the analysis of Gutiérrez et al. (2008), the idea behind 
the consolidation of the Grupo Empresarial Antioqueño 
(GEA – Antioquian Business Group), one of the principal 
economic groups in Colombia, arose because of a defen-
sive strategy against the drug cartels. the Gea is formed 
in part by highly liquid listed companies, four of which are 
among the nine that have issued adRs in Colombia: Ban-
colombia, Almacenes Éxito, Grupo de Inversiones Surameri-
cana, and Grupo Nutresa. the first has succeeded in its 
expansion plans and the second was recently sold to the 
Casino de Francia group. 
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this is just an example to illustrate the influence of drug 
trafficking in Colombia and the defensive business prac-
tices adopted by some legitimate firms. many firms and 
individuals have, in fact, been involved with illicit oper-
ations. some of them were listed in the Foreign assets 
Control office (oFaC) report called the Specialty Des-
ignated Nationals List (SDN List). this list includes the 
names of individuals and organizations with which per-
manent residents and citizens of the Us are prohibited 
from doing business with. inspecting the list (informally 
called the Clinton list) it is evident that Colombia has 
been the country with the greatest number of names on 
that list. in 2008 alone, Colombia has 9,309 references, 
mexico has 2,645, Brazil has 98, venezuela has 80, ar-
gentina has 56, and Chile has 31. as stated previously, 
trading in Us markets increases the demand for transpar-
ency and information disclosure, requirements that per-
sons or companies who have or have had relationships 
with illicit organizations could not accept.
However, it is important to highlight that since 1995 the 
Colombian government has improved the legal require-
ments about disclosure and corporate governance to pub-
lic and private firms in Colombia. in addition, since 2007 
the Colombian government has asked firms to implement 
the saRlaFt (system of administration of the Risk of 
table 3. industries and the decision of issue adrs.
country
industry argentina brazil chile colombia ecuador méxico perú Venezuela total
aerospace & defense 1 1
automobiles & Parts 1 1 1 3
Banks 5 6 3 1 1 2 3 21
Beverages 1 3 3 7
Chemicals 1 1 1 1 4
Construct.&materials 3 1 5 2 1 12
electricity 4 13 3 1 21
electron.&electriceq 3 1 4
Financial services 5 1 4 2 1 13
Fixed line telecom. 2 3 3 8
Food &drug Retailers 1 1 1 3
Food Producers 2 4 1 4 11
Forestry & Paper 2 1 1 4
Gas,H20&multiutility 2 3 1 6
General industrials 1 1 2
General Retailers 3 1 4
HealthCareequip.&ser 4 4
HouseGoods&HomeConst 3 5 8
indust.metals&mining 2 6 1 1 10
industrial engineer. 1 1 1 3
industrialtransport. 5 4 9
media 1 2 3 6
mining 1 1 2 4
mobile telecom. 1 1 2
oil & Gas Producers 3 5 1 9
oilequip.,serv.&dist 1 1
Personal Goods 1 1 1 3
Pharma. & Biotech. 1 1 2
Real estate inv&serv 3 14 1 2 1 21
support services 4 4
travel & leisure 2 1 1 4
total 28 100 16 9 1 45 6 9 214
this table shows the number of firms that issue adRs classified by industries for argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, mexico and venezuela. 
the most active industries issuing adRs are electricity, real estate investment and services, banks, financial services, food producers, and 
construct and materials. 
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money laundering and terrorism Financing) to make more 
difficult the money laundering and the financing of terror-
ism activities in the country. these efforts could, in part, 
explain the increase of adR’s issuers that grow from only 
one firm in 2000 to nine in 2010.
drug trafficking is not the only problem of internal order 
in Colombia. Probably the most important is the armed 
conflict with the left-wing guerrillas, the most important 
of these being the FaRC, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia (armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia), 
and with the right-wing paramilitary forces that fight with 
the guerrillas but also fight with the state. all subversive 
groups are active in the “kidnapping business,” as shown 
in Figure 6, where the growth of kidnapping cases has in-
creased since the eighties, reaching more than three thou-
sand in 2001. 
subversive groups in Colombia have always justified the 
armed conflict from an ideological point of view. violence 
associated with guerrillas is recent, dating back only to the 
late 1940s, when liberal peasants organized self-defense 
associations in response to Conservative attacks during La 
Violencia (Boudon, 1996). However, the presence of drug 
trafficking and use of resources from it to finance their 
activities de-legitimized this justification (Pizarro-leongó-
mez, 2004). according to duncan (2005, 2007), FaRC as 
well as the self-defense forces are armies and therefore 
can provide protective services to drug trafficking orga-
nizations. Both illegal actors dominate the drugs trade 
(duncan, 2006). drug trafficking consumes key resources; 
armed conflict and crime in Colombia are at high levels 
compared to other countries (echeverry, 2004). Besides, 
according to avilés (2006), the elite civilian politicians 
who dominated the Colombian state promoted formal in-
stitutional changes, but tolerated paramilitary repression 
in order to counteract a strengthening guerrilla insurgen-
cy. in summary, drug trafficking introduced an element 
of business reasoning into the Colombian armed conflict, 
which brought other effects of the conflict into the politi-
cal and economic sphere. 
this particular context is a key factor for doing business 
and investment initiatives in Colombia because it affects 
perceptions about the Colombian environment. the prob-
lems derived from drug trafficking and organized crime, 
supported by illegal groups in Colombia, increase the se-
curity risks for business people and foreign investors. it 
is evident that criminal bands use kidnapping, extortion, 
and robbery of businesspersons and civilians as financing 
mechanisms. Guerrillas and paramilitary groups carried out 
around 75% of the kidnappings in recent years, a percent-
age that has dramatically dropped thanks to the current 
FigUre 6. Historic evolution of persons kidnapped in colombia.
Source: Prepared with data from the National Police updated to August 2002. Published by the National Planning Department- DNP. http://www.dnp.gov.co/
the number of persons kidnapped in Colombia is shown for the period 1964-2001. there was an accelerated increase since the eighties, 
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government’s military offensive. these situations limit the 
willingness of foreign investors to buy shares of Colombian 
companies issued abroad because of the impact of the in-
ternal conflict problems on the operation of the firm, and 
in consequences, on the stock prices. this potentially limits 
the amount of funds that can be raised in foreign markets 
through the issuing of adRs.
the Colombian case is not unique in the world. Countries 
such as italy have lived similar situations. according to a 
Nuevo Diario (2004) report, the neapolitan mafia agreed 
with the italian groups Parmalat and Cirio to impose their 
products on the southern italian peninsula. in exchange 
for an “honorarium,” the mafia employed its traditional 
methods to intimidate small business owners. 
all this demonstrates there is, in fact, an understudied re-
lationship between organized crime and business where 
information disclosure and legitimacy plays a key role. 
First, “legal” businesses react to avoid infiltration by ille-
gal groups, in part, by increasing ownership concentration 
levels through complicated business arrangements that re-
duce the firm’s transparency which in turn make it harder 
for an international investor to be willing to invest capi-
tal in such a firm. second, the drug trafficking business 
(money laundering) was so widespread in the eighties and 
nineties that it touched many companies and individuals 
directly or indirectly, with or without their knowledge, and 
they faced restrictions on their participation in the interna-
tional market. and third, the evolution of the armed con-
flict in Colombia and the use of criminal practices such 
as kidnapping and systematic attacks on corporate infra-
structure substantially deteriorate the image of the coun-
try as a good place to invest. at the same time, this kind 
of illegal practices affects the willingness of the manag-
ers and owners of Colombian firms to implement high lev-
els of disclosure. to reveal information would also make 
managers and owners targets. this is one of the reasons 
behind the low level of information about ownership struc-
tures and shareholders of private firms in Colombia. the 
governmental organisms collect this information but keep 
it in the strictest confidence. this situation would lead to 
less cross-listing. 
From our theoretical model, the internal order problems, d, 
in Colombia are so high that it separates itself from other 
countries with similar economic and financial development 
levels in the adRs market. this affects the use of adRs as 
a viable governance mechanism. as we said before, the Co-
lombian case analyzed here allows us to give conceptual 
support for our model; however, the theory we developed 
could also be validated empirically in order to additionally 
gain statistical support.
conclusion 
We posited the question of why only few Colombian firms 
have issued adRs, despite the potential advantages of 
participating in the international financial market. We 
showed that in addition to the firms’ and country’s ob-
servable characteristics there are other factors, not usually 
taken into account in the literature, that affect the trans-
action costs of listing on the foreign market. Problems of 
social order such as illegal armed groups and illegal drug 
trafficking significantly reduce foreigners’ willingness to 
invest. Confronted with this situation, Colombian firms 
have excluded themselves from the adRs markets, and the 
possibility of using it as a signaling mechanism of good 
corporate governance. our theoretical proposal highlights 
the relevance of the security and institutional strengthen-
ing at country level for businesses in general and for good 
governance practices in particular.
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appendix 
Consider the following sequence of events (figure 1a).
the model has four periods. in t = 0, the controlling share-
holder has an initial level of risk and an investment oppor-
tunity, which could be carried out through the securing of 
funds in outside markets. in t = 1, the controlling sharehold-
er sells to outside investors a share participation necessary 
to advance the project. Prior to the sale, the controlling 
shareholder chooses the level of investor protection. in 
t = 2, the controlling shareholder retains a fraction of cash 
flows in order to later define the level of expropriation. en 
t = 3, payments are made to the controlling and minor-
ity shareholders. the controlling shareholder has an initial 
level of risk and an investment opportunity, which could 
be carried out through the securing of funds in foreign 
markets. the controlling shareholder sells outside investors 
share participation necessary to advance the project. Prior 
to the sale, the controlling shareholder chooses the level of 
investor protection. the controlling shareholder retains a 
fraction of cash flows in order to define the level of expro-
priation later. Payments are made to the controlling and 
minority shareholders.
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Proofs 
taking the problem of maximization proposed in equation 
(2).





First order conditions set out 
 ( ) 05.0
121 =+= qpaKbfnKadK  (a)
 05.02
2 == aKbfmqdq  (b)
From (b) it holds that 
 K
mqaKbf 25.0 12 =  (c)
Replacing (c) in (a)
 











+ 121 . (d)
starting from equation (d), denote 




aqKh ++= 2, 1 , from which it holds that 
h(K,q) = 1 + n (e), with hK < 0 y hq > 0, which implies an 
inverse relation between K and q. 
starting with the preceding, we proceed to demonstrate 
each of the propositions.
i. Proposition 1 
if m = 0 equation (c) holds that 05.0 12 =aKbf . From 
which, for constant values of b, a and K, necessarily f = 0. 










therefore, so that f = 0, (q → ∞) 
FigUre 1a. sequence of events related to a firm’s decision to issue adrs.
the controlling shareholder 
has wealth W and an 
investment opportunity 
that requires an amount of 
capital K.
the controlling shareholder 
chooses for the investor a 
level of protection, q, and 
later sells (K-W) to outside 
investors.
the controlling shareholder 
appropriates a fraction 
v of the firm’s cash flow 
and defines a level of 
expropriation f.
Payments for the controlling 
shareholder, and minority 
shareholders.
ii) Proposition 2 
From equation (e) it holds that h(K, q) = 1 + n, because of 
which it is known that
 




aqKh =++= 2, 1
so, to maintain equality, to the extent that m increases q 
must be reduced.
iii) Proposition 3 
From equation (e) it holds that h(K, q) = 1 + n, because of 
which it is known that
 




aqKh =++= 2, 1
so, to maintain equality, to the extent that p increases, q 
must decrease.
iv) Proposition 4 
starting from equation (e), h(K, q) = 1 + n, and taking as a 
starting point a specific level of n, in this case n0, a specific 
level of K, in this case K0, and assuming a constant q, then 
( ) 00 1, nqKh += . to the extent that n1 is present, such that 
n1 > n0, the following situation is generated:
 ( ) 10 1, nqKh +< .
Given that hK < 0, to maintain equality in the equation (e) 
then,
 ( ) 11 1, nqKh +=
in which K1 < K0. therefore, there is an inverse relation be-
tween n and K. 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3

